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WESTERN SAHARA: HISTORY,  
UN ACTING AND FOREIGN INTERESTS
José Maria Sydow de Barros1
Introduction
Some authors refer to Western Sahara as “the last colony” of Africa. 
Indeed, officially, the sahrawi territory has never been decolonized; thus, 
the situation of Western Sahara is very peculiar in the context of UN Peace 
Operations, when compared with another ongoing missions, and, yet, is 
quite unique in the geopolitical context, since the international community 
has divergent opinions regarding this territory. 
In this context, the present article aims to answer the following ques-
tion: Which are the main reasons that allows the deadlock for the resolution in 
the Western Sahara’s conflict, initiated in the 70s, to endure until the present 
days, even with the MINURSO establishment in 1991? The hypothesis sus-
tained is that the dilemma in the conflict solution in West Sahara continues 
due to political-economical interests, and also the interference/ interests of 
important global geopolitical actors, impelling that the diplomacy interme-
diate by the UN, through MINURSO, reaches the success and the aimed 
solution. In order to answer the proposed question, it is intended to present 
the history of the conflict until the MINURSO implementation, followed by 
the detailing of that mission and, in the end, to approach economical, strategic 
and geopolitical interests of the main actors involved in the sahrawi question. 
Finally, the conclusion will address the principal reasons that prevent 
the conflict’ solution in the Western Sahara. Furthermore, a consideration 
will be made regarding the effectiveness of the UN Mission in the territory. 
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Geographical and Historical Characteristics
The Western Sahara is a territory situated in the northwest of Africa, 
in the region known as Maghreb, and it has borders with Morocco, Algeria, 
and Mauritania, in addition to having the west coast bathed by the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
Map 1: African Continent
Source: https://www.ufrgs.br/cebrafrica/analises-de-conjuntura-africana-2/(2020).
The Berlin Conference, held in 1884, attributed to Spain the colo-
nization of the territory that encompassed the Western Sahara. Thus, the 
region remained under the administration of the Iberian country, during 
the period of 1884 to 1976. 
Nevertheless, the period post-World War II, specifically from the 
1950s, marked the beginning of the process of  Africa’s decolonization.These 
processes were driven by many factors, among which stand out: the weaken-
ing of the main european colonizing powers, the emergence of a nationalist 
sentiment (Pan-Africanism), corroborated by the UN Charter of 1945, which 
recognized the right of colonized peoples to self-determination, as as well as 
the polarization between the United States of America (USA) and the for-
mer Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), during the Cold War, since 
both countries saw decolonization as an opportunity to expand their zones 
of political and economical influence. 
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It was in this scenario that, in 1975, the signature of the Madrid 
Accord, involving Morocco, Mauritania and Spain, initiated the conflict that 
extends to the present days. On one side there is the Reign of Morocco, that 
occupies the west portion of the territory, about 85%. On the other side, sepa-
rated by a wall of sand with extension of more than 2.500 km and surrounded 
by land mines, known as The Berm, there is the rest of the territory, under 
the control of Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro 
(POLISARIO Front)2, a political-revolutionary movement, founded in 1973, 
to fight for the independence of the sahrawi people from Spain and, later, 
against the moroccan occupation. 
In this context, through the resolution 690, on April 29, 1991, the 
Security Council (SC) authorized the United Nations Mission for the Refer-
endum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)3, which aims for the organization and 
conduction of a referendum of self-determination in the sahrawi territory. 
Origin of the standoff in Western Sahara
Spain’s relationship with the Western Sahara territory has existed 
since 1497, when the Spaniards were trying to protect their possessions in the 
Canary Islands. In this context, they reached the population of native tribes to 
enslave them as manpower, seeking the exploitation of the natural resources 
available in the Canary Islands (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018). 
Almost three centuries after the first contacts with the native tribes’ 
population, in 1884, anticipating the Berlin Conference, Spain sent a mission 
to the sahrawi territory, in order to claim uti possidetis to make the region 
a spanish protectorate (Estrada 2016). Thus, during that conference, the 
spanish protectorate was recognized and, after successive agreements with 
France, it was established that Spain would control the lands below the parallel 
21º 20’ N. In this place, Spain established three garnishes: La Guera, in the 
South; Villa Cisneros, in the Middle, and Villa Bens, in the North (Daudén 
and Suzin 2011). 
Initially, the spanish occupation was limited to the coast of its col-
ony. However, from 1934, two factors encouraged the Spaniards to seek the 
interiorization of the territory. The first one was a new agreement, settled 
2 Saguia el-Hamra e Rio de Oro were the extreme limits that divided the territory of the Spa-
nish Sahara, situated in the North and in the South, respectively. 
3 French initials, Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un référendum au Sahara 
Occidental.
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with France, which demanded measures from Spain to shield the frontiers 
of the colonies belonging to the two european countries, impelling the attack 
of natives. In order to attend to this demand, Spain sent spanish militaries 
to the region, with the purpose to monitor and patrol the area. The second 
motivating factor for the territory’s interiorization were the speculations 
about the existence of big phosphate reserves in the region (Estrada 2014). 
In these circumstances, in the early 1950s, emerged in Morocco the 
Dij Tahrir, or Liberation Army, with the goal to expel the european colonizers. 
This movement was originated from many guerrilla groups that had grown 
after the french expelled the moroccan sultan Mohammed V. However, even 
with the moroccan independence from France, in 1956, the movement stayed 
active, but now, it ambitioned the withdrawal of european colonizers of all 
the territory, and the unification of part of Maghreb, that Morocco believed 
be part of the “Greater Morocco” (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018). 
The conception of “Greater Morocco” has its origins in 1950, when 
Allal el-Fassi, leader of Istiqlal, a center-right party of the moroccan politics, 
understood that the moroccan empire extended beyond its territorial limits, 
encompassing, in addition to Morocco, the whole of Western Sahara, Mau-
ritania, the spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as part of Algeria 
and Mali (Ferreira 2018). 
In 1956, Mohammed V returned to the newly independent Morocco, 
and started to claim all the territory he believed being part of the “Greater 
Morocco”. This claim was initiated by the Ifni province, belonging to Spain. 
Subsequently, in 1957, Spain lost the war against Morocco by the referred 
province and, as a consequence, they ceded the province of Villa Bens to 
Morocco. Thus, from now on, the spanish domains were limited to the Sahara, 
below the parallel 27o 40’N, an area of approximately 260,000 square kilo-
meters (Daudén and Suzin 2011). 
Due to the defeat suffered to Morocco and, in addition, to contain the 
expansion of the Liberation Army among the sahrawi, in 1958, Spain altered 
the status of the Western Sahara, which ceased to be a spanish colony and 
became a province of Spain, of number 53, going on to be called Spanish 
Sahara (Daudén and Suzin 2011). As a result of this move, an intense process 
of urbanization was initiated in the so-called Spanish Sahara, with the appli-
cation of massive investments, especially in infrastructure. The capital was 
established in Laayoune and, in order to take the development to the coun-
tryside of the desert, 5.494 km of roadway were constructed (Estrada 2014). 
The beginning of the UN’s involvement in the Western Sahara issue 
occured in 1963, when the organization classified the Spanish Sahara as one 
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of the elegible territories in the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. According to the declaration, the 
sahrawi people should exercise its right of choice and decide between: its 
independence, becoming a sovereign State; free association with Spain or the 
integration with that same european country. For any of the decisions to be 
taken, it would be imperative to hold a referendum, in which the population 
itself would decide its future (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018).
From this moment, the UN started, through resolutions, to pressure 
Spain in order to proceed the self-determination referendum. Beyond the 
UN pressure, Morocco and Mauritania started to claim the realization of 
the referendum in the Spanish Sahara’s territory (Daudén and Suzin 2011).
Meanwhile, on May 10, 1973, the POLISARIO Front was created, 
from the junction of two sahrawi nationalist groups: those originated in 
Tan-Tan, formed by a sahrawi academic elite, who studied in Morocco, and 
the sahrawis from Zouerat in Mauritania. In addition to these groups, many 
sahrawi workers and soldiers from the Spanish Sahara joined the POLISA-
RIO Front4 (Justo 2013).
The POLISARIO Front was created with a very specific purpose: the 
independence from Spain and the formation of an independent sahrawi State, 
as demonstrated in the first article of the Movement Statute:
POLISARIO Front is a National Liberation Movement, originated 
from a long sahrawi resistance against all forms of foreign domi-
nation in which sahrawis are voluntarily mobilized, for the fight of 
national independence and the recovery of sahrawi sovereignty in the 
whole RASD territory5 (Justo 2013). 
It is important to highlight that the POLISARIO movement emerged 
from a pan-arabist and socialist ideology, since it had as a model of inspiration 
the Egyptian, the Libyan, and, mainly, the Algerian liberation movements. 
All of those movements awakened, in the youngest sahrawi population, the 
urge to conquer its independence (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018 apud 
Cobo 2011).
Right after its creation, the POLISARIO Front declared war against 
Spain, starting to carry out numerous guerrilla actions against spanish patrols 
and posts, in addition to implementing kidnappings and sabotages, which 
4 Our translation.
5 Our translation. 
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resulted in the deaths of eight Spaniards (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 
2018 apud Miguel 1995). 
In this context, suffering with sahrawi incursions, Spain was very 
vulnerable, since, at this time, the country was in a period of great internal 
instability, due to of Francisco Franco’s weakened state of health and, con-
sequently, the crisis of the Francoist regime (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 
2018). All this instability was determinant for Spain to, in 1974, pressured 
by the UN, decide to conduct a census with the native population to hold 
the referendum of self-determination, planned to take place in the first half 
of 1975 (Estrada 2014).
However, this referendum never happened. Morocco did not accept 
the independence of Spanish Sahara as one of the voting options, as it believed 
that this territory belonged to the country. Therefore, the King of Morocco, 
Hassan II, asked Spain to postpone the referendum and, at the same time, 
joined to Mohtar uld Dada, then president of Mauritania, to request an opin-
ion before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legal ties between 
the Spanish Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania (Barata 2012).
As a consequence, in October 1975, the ICJ’s opinion established that 
neither Morocco nor Mauritania had the right to claim the Western Sahara’s 
territory – as it came to be called by the international community – ratifying 
the understanding that Spain should hold the referendum on self-determi-
nation, as noted in the following excerpt from the ICJ opinion6:
[...] Hence, the Court found no legal ties that could affect the applica-
tion of resolution 1514 in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, 
in particular, the principle of self-determination through the free and 
genuine expression of the territory’s people’s will [...] (ICJ 1975).
As soon as ICJ's opinion was released, King Hassan II made a 
national statement calling on the Moroccans to march towards Western 
Sahara in order to retake the plundered lands and liberate the population 
from spanish colonization (Daudén and Suzin 2011). Thus approximately 
350,000 Moroccans, escorted by the Royal Moroccan Army and encouraged 
by the benefits offered by the Kingdom, such as tax exemptions, for example, 
occupied the northern part of the territory of Western Sahara. This episode 
became known as the “Green March” and was an important maneuver to 
pressure Spain to negotiate (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018).
6 Our translation.
109José Maria Sydow de Barros
Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 5, n. 10, Jul./Dec. 2020 | p. 103-126
Days after the “Green March”, Spain, unable to face a war against 
Morocco due to the collapse of Francoism, secretly signed an agreement 
with Morocco and Mauritania: the Madrid Agreement. In this agreement, 
Spain divided the administration of the sahrawi territory, leaving one part 
with Morocco and the other part with Mauritania; in return, Spain would 
continue to administer the rest of the territory, until 1976, and would remain 
with 35% of the economic rights over Western Sahara resources (fisheries and 
phosphate) (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018 apud Franck and Hoffman 
1975-76).
With the occupation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, the 
POLISARIO Front began an intense combat, using guerrilla tactics, against 
the two countries, and starting the war itself (Estrada 2014). On 26 Feb-
ruary, 1976, Spain officially withdrew from the territory, and the next day, 
the POLISARIO Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Repub-
lic (RASD), created for the purpose of giving international legitimacy and 
claiming sovereignty over Western Sahara. According to Estrada (2014), “the 
RASD functions today as a sui generis Republic, by acting as a state-in-exile 
that manages the lives of refugees in the semi-autonomous territory granted 
by Algeria”. 
Implementation of MINURSO
In 1979, Mauritania decided to withdraw from Western Sahara, 
considering that its troops were drained, due to the guerrilla implemented 
by the POLISARIO Front. On the other hand, after the Mauritanian with-
drawal, Morocco extended its occupation to the part of the territory that was 
disoccupied by Mauritania, inflaming the conflict against the POLISARIO 
Front (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018). Between the late 1970s and 
the beginning of the 80s, POLISARIO Front conquered a good political and 
military advantage, materialized by the growing recognization by the interna-
tional community and the conquest of important territorial areas, including 
significant localities (Barata 2012).
In the beginning of 1976, OAU was involved in the Western Sahara 
issue, given that the conflict contradicted the values inscribed in the charter 
governing the organization, which sought to foster progress from cooper-
ation between African states. Therefore, OAU assumed the conduct of the 
negotiation process between the parties. Taking advantage of the interest and 
involvement of the OAU in the issue, the RASD requested its entry into the 
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organization, being officially recognized as a member in 1982. Following the 
admission of RASD, Morocco left the organization in 19847 (Ferreira 2018).
In the military field, as a response to the military conquests obtained 
by the POLISARIO Front, during 1981 and 1987, Morocco constructed a 
huge wall of sand and stone, known as The Berm, which divided the Western 
Sahara in two zones: the Occupied Zones, dominated by Morocco, located in 
the western side of the wall and that encompasses 85% of the territory; and 
the Liberated Zones, about 15% of the territory, controlled by the POLISARIO 
Front, located in the eastern side of the wall (Duarte 2016).
Photo 1: The Berm
Source: The author.
Thereby, taking advantage of the process already conducted by the 
OAU in 1984, the UN effectively decides to intervene in the progress of the 
negotiations, taking its command and encouraging Morocco and the POLIS-
ARIO Front to begin the talks (Ferreira 2018). 
In 1988, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front agreed with the UN 
proposition to effectuate a ceasefire and, later, to realize the self-determination 
referendum. In this way, a definitive ceasefire was signed in 1991, one year 
7 In 2017, Morocco was readmitted to the African Union (AU), successor to the OAU, after 
receiving 39 favorable votes out of a total of 54 member countries. 
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after the approving of the Settlement Plan8 by the Security Council. Later this 
year, MINURSO was created (Estrada 2014).
Since then, the main obstacle to the negotiations is the lack of a 
consensus on the identification of voters who would have the right to vote in 
the referendum on self-determination. On one hand, the POLISARIO Front 
advocates that the electorate be formed according to the census conducted in 
1974; on the other hand, Morocco demands the expansion of the list of voters, 
since, from 1975, the year in which the “Green March” was held, there was 
an increase of Moroccans in Western Sahara, making increasing the  chances 
of success in the referendum (Estrada 2014). 
MINURSO's acting in the diplomatic field
In order to guide the sequence of MINURSO actions, aiming the real-
ization of the self-determination referendum, the Settlement Plan, approved 
by the UN SC, established four phases9:
Phase 1 - Ceasefire monitoring. Focuses on the ongoing monitoring 
of the ceasefire agreed between the parties to the conflict in order 
to create favorable conditions for the political peace process to 
move forward;
Phase 2 - Transition phase. It will be iniated from the publication of 
the list of persons authorized to vote and will lead to the reduc-
tion and containment of forces of the Royal Moroccan Army and 
the POLISARIO Front;
Phase 3 - Referendum Phase. It will focus on the military support 
necessary for the successful holding of the referendum;
Phase 4 - Post-referendum phase. It will correspond to the decrease 
of personnel and the complete withdrawal of the military com-
ponent in Western Sahara, when conditions allow (UN 2015).
In this context, aligned with the planning predicted on the Settlement 
Plan, originally, the mandate of MINURSO, in summary, stipulated the fol-
lowing actions to be triggered10:
8 Present in the Report of the Secretary-General of the UN (S/21360, 18 June 1990), it envi-
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a. to monitor the ceasefire;
b. to verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory;
c. to monitor the confinement of Moroccan troops and the POLISA-
RIO Front in designated locations;
d. to take actions with the parties to secure the release of all prisoners 
or political detainees from Western Sahara;
e. to oversee the exchange of prisoners of war;
f. to implement a refugee repatriation program from Western Sahara;
g. to identify and register qualified voters;
h. to organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim 
the results (UN 2015).
It is important to highlight that, according to the premises of the 
Settlement Plan, the self-determination referendum should have occurred in 
the year following the implementation of MINURSO, i.e., in 1992. However, 
due to the lack of consensus regarding the composition of the electorate, the 
same was not accomplished (Duarte 2016).
Therefore, by mid-1996, MINURSO was going through a very critical 
period, with all voters identification centres closed. Soon, in an attempt to 
advance the negotiation process, the UN Secretary-General appointed the 
US James Baker11 to intermediate the negotiations.  Thus, in 1997, for the 
first time throughout the peace process, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front 
committed each other to an accord that became known as the Houston Agree-
ment, which enviosioned the holding of a referendum on self-determination 
in 1998 (Ferreira 2018).
However, the Houston Agreement failed. After MINURSO reopened 
the identification centres to finally determine who had the right to vote in the 
referendum, the Moroccan stance, which sought to “flood” the identification 
centres with new names, in order to ensure a greater number of voters in 
favor, ultimately determined the failure of the agreement, making it impos-
sible to hold the referendum in 1998 (Ferreira 2018).
Still confident in a solution to the deadlock in Western Sahara, in 
2011, James Baker presented a new plan, known as the Baker Plan I, which 
proposed a certain autonomy for Western Sahara, recognizing its integration 
with Morocco. The plan was immediately accepted by the Moroccans, but 
11 American politician and diplomat who served as Secretary of State of the United States, 
during the period of 1989 to 1992, when he worked in American foreign policy towards the 
Middle East, especially during the Persian Gulf War (Ferreira 2018).
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refused by the POLISARIO Front. Therefore, the proposal was redefined 
and, in 2003, Baker Plan II was published, suggesting a three-year period 
in which the territory would be administered by a government elected by the 
sahrawi population and, after the provisional period, a referendum would 
be held, establishing as voters all residents in the region since 1999, so that 
the population decided between independence, integration or autonomy. 
The POLISARIO Front accepted the definitions of the Baker Plan II, but, 
surprisingly, Morocco rejected it. Even if the proposal defined all residents 
in the region since 1999 as voters, as claimed by the Moroccans, Morocco 
stated that it would not agree to any proposal that would allow the Western 
Sahara’s independence (Duarte 2016).
Negotiations continued without progress and, in 2007, Morocco sub-
mitted its proposal for Western Sahara, the Saharan Autonomous Region, 
which was based on the granting of sahrawi autonomy, but within a frame-
work of moroccan sovereignty. On the other hand, at the same time, the 
POLISARIO Front presented its own proposal, based on its desire for self-de-
termination and independence (Estrada 2014).
Since then, it appears that the Security Council resolutions on the 
issue of Western Sahara appear to be the result of a superficial discussion on 
the subject, indicating that the deadlock has been dealt with in such a way 
as simply to “comply with the agenda”, limiting itself to the annual renewal 
of the MINURSO’s mandate, without proposing any concrete measure or 
action that would make it possible to resolve the issue.
The military component of MINURSO
While the negotiations in the diplomatic field are marked by numer-
ous disagreements, the military component of MINURSO aims to monitor 
and assist the parties in the conflict in complying with the provisions of the 
ceasefire, according to the Settlement Plan and the Military Agreements nº 
1, no 2, and no 312  (UN 2015, 26).
For this, the map below presents the unfolding of MINURSO in 
Western Sahara’s territory.
12 Our translation.
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Map 2: Unfolding of MINURSO
Source: UN (2015).
As can be seen in the map above, the military component of the mis-
sion is unfolding in Laayoune, where is located the MINURSO’s headquarter 
(MHQ) and the Medical Unity of the mission, and in 09 (nine) Team Sites13, 
where 04 (four) are located to the West of the Berm – Awsard, Oum Dreyga, 
Smara and Mahbas – in territory controlled by Morocco, and other 05 (five) 
located to the East of the Berm, in the region controlled by the POLISARIO 
Front: Agwanit, Mijeck, Mehaires, Tifariti and Bir Lahlou. 
13 Team Site is the english terminology to the base or station work of the UN Military Obser-
vers. In the specific case of MINURSO, the military observers live and work in the team sites. 
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Photo 2: Team Site Mehaires
Source: The author.
The Military Agreement no 1 (MA No 1) is an agreement signed 
between the POLISARIO Front and the MINURSO, in december 1997, and 
between MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan Army, in january 1998. It should 
be noted that it does not refer to a military agreement between the parties to 
the conflict, but rather to an agreement signed by the parties with MINURSO. 
The agreement establishes guidelines and procedures that must be followed 
by both parties, in the context of the ceasefire, in order to avoid any kind of 
hostility. In this way, in the military field, it is a vital document for the daily 
work of MINURSO, carried out by the Military Observers, since it defines 
the actions characterized as “violations”, not only of the agreement, but also 
violations contrary to the spirit of the peace process14 (UN 2015, 26).
Thus, MA 1 also establishes important geographical definitions in 
the territory of Western Sahara, dividing it into three distinct areas, taking as 
a reference the Berm: Buffer Strip, Restricted Area and Areas with Limited 
Restrictions. In addition, it describes which activities, military or otherwise, 
may be undertaken in each of the geographical areas, and establishes the 
necessary procedures for obtaining authorization from MINURSO to conduct 
them15 (UN 2015, 26).
14 Our translation.
15 Our translation.
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Figure 1: Geographical definitions established in MA 1
Source: The author.
By the other hand, in April 1999, MINURSO and the POLISARIO 
Front signed the Military Agreement no 2, while Military Agreement no 3 
was signed in March 1999, between MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan 
Army. Although signed separately with each of the parties, the agreements 
are essentially the same, referring to the procedures for reducing the threat 
caused by the existence of mines and failed devices, through the exchange 
of information between the parties and MINURSO, aiming at the marking 
and destruction of all found artifacts16 (UN 2015, 27).
Thus, in order to achieve the objectives of monitoring and assisting 
the warring parties in complying with the ceasefire provisions, the Military 
Observers carry out numerous actions in the field, with the intention of mon-
itoring the activities of the Royal Moroccan Army and the POLISARIO Front, 
among which stand out: the execution of day and night patrols throughout 
the area of operations, frequent visits to the military units of the warring 
parties to verify changes in the Battle Order17, monitoring the conduct of 
military exercises and training of the parties, and conducting monthly liaison 
meetings with the Moroccan and Sahrawi military leaders in their respective 
areas of operations. 
Economic, strategic and geopolitical interests
Over the course of more than 40 years of conflict, geopolitics offers a 
very enlightening viewpoint towards the impasses involving self-determina-
16 Our translation.
17 Information on personnel, units and equipment of a force, friend or foe, including, if pos-
sible, effective, identification, location, command structure, historical and other data relating 
to units and military personalities (EME 2018).
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tion in Western Sahara, especially when it is analysed, from Spanish rule, the 
involvement of important international actors in the Sahrawi issue. Besides 
the territorial question, embodied by the Moroccan ambition in the forma-
tion of “Greater Morocco”, there are several economic interests that justify 
Morocco’s insistence on occupying Western Sahara. Although the Sahrawi 
territory is characterized by a typical desert environment, the region possesses 
numerous natural riches, which highlight both the Moroccan ambition and 
the interest of states and companies, private or public, contributing to the 
unresolved conflict.
In this context, in order to facilitate trade of resources from Western 
Sahara, Morocco issues a certificate of origin stating that all products come 
from Moroccan territory. In this way, the country can profit from the exploita-
tion of Sahrawi resources without inflaming international public opinion, 
since many countries legitimize the RASD18 (Hagen 2008).
Initially, the Sahrawi coast is very prosperous for the practice of fish-
ing, as it houses the Canary Island-Saharan fishing bank, considered one of 
the largest and richest on the planet, extending for 150,000 Km2 in front of the 
Sahrawi coast (López 2012). According to Ferreira (2018) apud Zoubir (2006), 
“the Western Sahara has 700 Km of Atlantic coast with strategic importance. 
Moreover, the territory retains one of the richest waters for fishing in the 
world, which today are exploited illegally by Morocco and EU members”. 
In 2007, the European Union (EU) concluded the Sustainable Fish-
eries Partnership Agreement with the Kingdom of Morocco. The agreement 
lasted until 2011 and, during this period, the Moroccans received approxi-
mately EUR 36 million per year to authorise fishing for EU-linked vessels 
in the waters of the Western Sahara’s coast (Ferreira 2018). Although the 
European Parliament has recently submitted reservations for the continua-
tion of the renewal of the agreement, in early 2019 the EU Council adopted 
the new Treaty, applicable for four years, fixing an overall financial contri-
bution of EUR 208 million for Morocco. Even if the EU Council states that 
“nothing in the Fisheries Agreement or its Implementing Protocol implies 
recognition of the sovereignty or sovereign rights of the Kingdom of Morocco 
over Western Sahara and its adjacent waters”, in practice if the approval of 
the agreement only ratifies the impasse over the Sahrawi territory, favoring 
Moroccan rule (UE 2019).
Another important natural resource in Western Sahara is phosphate, 
which had already prompted economic interest since 1960, when phosphate 
reserves were discovered in Bou Craa, initiating economic exploitation by 
18 Our translation.
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Spain, which, in 1976, on the occasion of the signing of the Madrid Agree-
ment, received, as a counterpart, 35% of the economic rights deriving from its 
exploitation (Barata 2012). Although phosphate is not a very valuable good, it 
is still extremely important and has a very comprehensive utility, highlighting 
its application in the production of agricultural fertilizers. Meanwhile, accord-
ing to data from the United States Geopolitical Survey (USGS), only three 
countries concentrate 75% of the world’s phosphate reserves, 42.3% of which 
are in Morocco (including the existing reserves in Western Sahara), which has 
21,000 billion tons, China, in second place, with 26% and the United States, 
with 7% (Souza and Cardoso 2008). Note that these numbers, mathematically, 
are already quite expressive; however, relating them to the projection that, 
until the year 2034/ 2035 the peak of the world production of phosphate is 
reached, which will decrease from then on, existing phosphate reserves in 
Western Sahara grow in economic and strategic importance (Ferreira 2018).
In this scenario, it should be noted that Western Sahara has the 
largest conveyor belt system in the world, with more than 100 Km of exten-
sion, connecting the mines of Bou Craa to the port of Laayoune. In this way, 
Morocco controls and profits from this system, since all extracted phosphate 
is quickly and easily drained to the port and shipped for export (Ferreira 
2018). Thus, mineral exploitation in this region receives massive foreign 
investments, allocated to Moroccan state-owned enterprises, which domi-
nate most of the exploitation, maintaining partnerships with various private 
actors around the world, mainly with the US and Europe (Menezes, Morais 
and Carvalho 2018).
In addition to fishing and phosphate, it is speculated that both the 
interior of the territory and the Sahrawi continental shelf can hold important 
oil and natural gas reserves. Therefore, there are foreign companies that have 
settled in the territory and carry out studies in search of such reservation 
(Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018 apud ONHYM 2020).
Once again, the understanding is ratified that the presence of foreign 
companies in the Sahrawi territory, such as the French company Total and 
the US company Kosmos, which have oil exploration contracts with Morocco, 
in addition to the granting of licenses by the Moroccan state oil company, 
ONHYM, for oil research and exploration in Western Sahara, they end up in 
a way legitimizing the Moroccan presence in the Sahrawi territory. Since the 
beginning of the Sahrawi conflict, it has been apparent that the strategic and 
geopolitical interests of important external actors, mainly with the Kingdom 
of Morocco, have been decisive in the emergence and maintenance of the 
impasse regarding the self-determination of Western Sahara (Estrada 2014). 
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At the regional level, Algeria stands out as an important external 
player in the Western Sahara question. Since the beginning of the conflict, the 
Algerians have always been in favor of the Sahrawi people’s self-determina-
tion, and are the main supporters of the POLISARIO Front, also sheltering the 
thousands of Sahrawi refugees who are concentrated in the Tindouf region. It 
should be noted that Algeria has a historical rivalry with Morocco, especially 
related to territorial disputes, such as the one that motivated the Sand War 
in 1963, in addition to the dispute for political hegemony in the Maghreb 
region. As such, the integration of Western Sahara by Morocco represents a 
dangerous precedent for the question of the inviolability of borders, and may 
even affect the integrity of Algerian territory. Another important geostrategic 
factor for Algeria is the exit to the Atlantic Ocean, which would be possible 
with the independence of Western Sahara, facilitated through the Saharan 
territory (Ferreira and Migon 2015).
Spain, a power that theoretically still manages Western Sahara, is 
another prominent player in the Saharan question. The signing of the Madrid 
Agreement in 1975 marked a change in the stance of the Spanish Govern-
ment, which until then was in favor of holding a referendum on the self-deter-
mination of the Sahrawi people (Smolarek 2013). However, in general, Spain 
maintains a rather ambiguous stance towards the Western Sahara conflict. 
If on the one hand, in the early 70’s, it was in favor of Sahrawi self-determi-
nation, on the other, it tries to maintain a good relationship with Morocco 
and the international community, since the Spanish-Moroccan relationship 
involves economic and geostrategic issues19 (Miyares 2006). 
From an economic point of view, the fisheries agreements signed 
by the EU with Morocco are of great importance for the Spanish fishing 
industry. On the other hand, Morocco’s own geographical location qualifies 
it as an important state in controlling immigration, terrorism and drug traf-
ficking from North Africa. Consequently, good relations with Morocco are a 
relevant factor for both Spain and the EU20 (Estrada 2014; Miyares 2006). In 
addition, Morocco uses its claims on Ceuta and Melila, territories of Spain 
located in northern Morocco, to pressure the Spaniards to support the Moroc-
can demand on Western Sahara. Thus, despite the constant pressure from 
public opinion to support Sahrawi self-determination, Spain refrains from 
putting pressure on the Kingdom of Morocco, as it could trigger a period of 
instability, which would result in serious consequences for the interests of 
Spain (Menezes, Morais and Carvalho 2018).
19 Our translation.
20 Our translation.
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Throughout the conflict, France has presented itself as Morocco’s 
main ally in the Western Sahara issue. From the moment Moroccan king-
dom first claimed the Sahrawi territory in 1963, immediately after the UN 
included it in the list of Non-self-Governing Territories and decolonization 
pending, France supported the Moroccan demand, even after the ICJ decision 
in 197521 (Fuentes 2014).
In this context, French support is not just a rhetoric, since it involves 
concrete actions in the military and economic field. The referendum in West-
ern Sahara could unbalance the internal politics of Morocco, France’s largest 
ally in the Maghreb, reflecting the loss of French influence in that region. 
For this reason, in the course of the conflict, France provided substantial 
military support to Morocco, with the supply of armaments and even with the 
sending of French troops to fight against the POLISARIO Front (Menezes, 
Morais and Carvalho 2018).
In the economic field, in addition to the increase of Morocco’s mil-
itary and financial dependence on the French, it should be noted that the 
most important companies in France have numerous trade agreements with 
Morocco, especially those operating in the area of strategic resources in the 
Sahrawi territory, such as oil and phosphate, which demonstrates that an 
independent Western Sahara is contrary to France’s economic interests in 
the region22 (Fuentes 2014).
However, the greatest French support for Moroccan demand in rela-
tion to Western Sahara is in its work with the UN Security Council. Since 
the implementation of MINURSO in 1991, France has used its position as a 
permanent member of the SC to influence the decisions and resolutions of 
that organization in favor of Moroccan interests (Ferreira and Migon 2015). 
As an example of this influence are the French vetoes on the inclusion of 
MINURSO competence for the protection of human rights in Western Sahara, 
making it the only UN mission not operating in this area (Duarte 2016).
Another important external actor in the Western Sahara issue is the 
US. From a historical point of view, it should be noted that Morocco was the 
first country to recognize the independence of the USA, being therefore one 
of its oldest allies23 (Solà-Martín 2019). Furthermore, it is important to note 
that the conflict in Western Sahara was born at a very peculiar geopolitical 
moment: the Cold War. During this ideological conflict, the US guided its 
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geopolitically relevant to its interests, trying to contain the expansion of com-
munism and the area of influence of the USSR (Barata 2012).
In this way, Morocco’s privileged strategic location at the entrance 
to the Mediterranean Sea, giving access to one of the most important mar-
itime routes in the world, became an extension of American influence in 
the Maghreb region. Thus, during the Cold War, Morocco received massive 
investments in the military and economic fields from the US. As an example, 
in the 1950s, the Americans installed, on Moroccan soil, missile launch bases 
aimed at the USSR24 (Solà-Martin 2009).
In the economic field, it should be noted that, between 1975 and 
1990, Morocco received more than 1/5 of the total US aid to Africa, being 
more than 1 billion dollars in military assistance and 1.3 billion dollars in 
economic aid (Road 2014 apud Zoubir 2009). In this scenario, the USSR was, 
even indirectly, another external actor in the conflict, since all the weapons 
used by the POLISARIO Front were of Soviet origin, purchased by Algeria 
and Libya and then ceded to the Sahrawis, allowing the POLISARIO Front 
to have a considerable arsenal of weapons at no cost (Ferreira 2012).
For this reason, the US strongly supported the Moroccan army during 
the confrontation against the POLISARIO Front, offering training for the 
military and making it possible to sell weapons to equip Moroccan troops, 
since, in the Cold War scenario, it was important for the US that Morocco 
maintained its stable monarchy, in addition to ensuring that Western Sahara, 
closely linked to Algeria and Libya, did not become independent due to the 
threat of communist expansion that would be characterized (Road 2014). 
Furthermore, the instability of the Moroccan government, and of the region 
as a whole, could hamper transit through the Mediterranean Sea, preventing 
US access to the Persian Gulf, including by air (López 2012).
With the end of the Cold War, the securitization of Western Sahara did 
not cease to exist, however, a new approach emerged, inserted in the context 
of the US-led Global War on Terror, since the attacks of 11 September 2001. 
Therefore, according to Estrada (2014) apud Zoubir (2008), the new Ameri-
can interests in the Maghreb region are due to two reasons: 1) economic and 
political interests, related to the demand for energy (oil and natural gas) and 
the regionalization of the Maghreb as a potential market for US corporations; 
and 2) military and security interests, related to the need to monitor/ control 
issues such as Islam, terrorism and democratization.
At this juncture of the Global War on Terror, Morocco sought to 
associate the POLISARIO Front with some international terrorist organiza-
24 Our translation.
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tions, such as Al-Qaeda Maghreb, a “branch” of the known terrorist group 
operating in North Africa. This Moroccan attitude aims to consolidate, in a 
more intense way, the American opposition to any Sahrawi claim (Ferreira 
and Migon 2015). Finally, from the analysis of the actions of the main external 
actors that influence the solution of the conflict, it can be seen that realpolitik 
permeates all the dynamics in the question of Western Sahara. 
Conclusion
This article sought to address the dynamics surrounding the Sah-
rawi question, seeking to answer the following question: What are the main 
reasons that allow the deadlock for the resolution of the Western Sahara’s 
conflict, which began in the 1970s, to endure until the present day, even with 
the establishment of MINURSO in 1991?
In response to this question, it was found that the conflict in Sahrawi 
territory actually started in 1976, after the signing of the Madrid Agreement. 
This agreement was in practice an affront to the principle of self-determi-
nation of peoples, established by the UN Charter in 1945. Furthermore, it is 
noted that there was a clear disregard for the ICJ opinion drawn up in 1975. 
Since the beginning of the conflict, it has been observed that the 
economic, strategic and geopolitical interests of important external actors in 
the region, especially Spain, France and the United States, have underpinned 
the dynamics surrounding the Sahrawi question.
In addition to the territorial issue that initiated the Moroccan claim to 
control the area, the formation of the “Greater Morocco”, it can be observed 
that Western Sahara possesses numerous natural resources, which, by them-
selves, materialize the interest of Moroccan and other states in the region. 
Therefore, the establishment of a good relationship with the Kingdom of 
Morocco is a sine qua non for the maintenance of the interests of major 
world powers in the Maghreb region. 
Regarding the diplomacy undertaken by the UN, especially after 
the implementation of MINURSO, it can be seen that the performance of 
external players contributed to the perpetuation of the impasse. As pointed 
out by Barata (2012, 151), the support of important geopolitical actors to 
the Moroccan cause, such as France and the United States, two permanent 
members of the UN SC, allowed the conflict to be treated from the outset 
only as a deadlock on self-determination, which Morocco opposes because 
of its territorial integrity, based on historical rights, that is, the conflict was 
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not treated as a matter of aggressive territorial expansion. This implies that, 
in practice, the issue of Western Sahara referred to Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter - “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, based on the consensus between 
the parties - not Chapter VII - “Action in the Case of Threat to Peace, Break 
of Peace and Act of Aggression” -, which would require more energetic and 
effective action by the SC, including the imposition, through sanctions or 
coercion, of a solution to the impasse.
Thus, although the UN has been involved in the issue since 1991, up 
to the present moment, it is evident the inability of the SC resolutions and 
the MINURSO action to put into practice the holding of the referendum on 
self-determination, which should have been conducted in 1992, due to the 
constant deadlocks in the negotiations. However, the actions of MINURSO 
have some positive aspects, especially in the military component of the mis-
sion, which has delayed the consolidation of Moroccan sovereignty in Western 
Sahara. In this context, it can currently be stated that MINURSO is limited 
to actions to monitor the ceasefire, to reduce threats caused by mines and 
failed devices and to support confidence-building measures between the 
parties and the UN, all of which are implemented, effectively, by the Military 
Observers of the mission.
Finally, it is concluded that, in the dynamics of the Western Sahara 
question, economic, strategic and geopolitical interests continue to prevail 
over respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples. Thus, the 
solution to the impasse remains quite distant. 
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ABSTRACT
This article aims to answer the following question: What are the main reasons that 
allow the impasse for the resolution of the conflict in Western Sahara, which began 
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in the 1970s, to last until the present day, even with the establishment of MINURSO, 
in 1991? The hypothesis considered is that the impasse in the resolution of the con-
flict in Western Sahara persists to the present day due to political-economic interests 
and the interference/ interest of important global geopolitical actors, preventing 
diplomacy brokered by the UN, through MINURSO, achieve the desired success and 
solution. In order to find the answer to the proposed problem, through a qualitative 
bibliographic research, an analysis of the history of the conflict was initially carried 
out until the implementation of MINURSO, followed by the detailing of that mission 
and, finally, the economic, strategic and geopolitical interests of the main global actors 
involved in the Sahrawi question were addressed. In conclusion, it is observed that, 
since the beginning of the conflict, the involvement of important geopolitical actors 
contributed to the beginning and to the maintenance of the impasse over the years, 
motivated mainly by economic, strategic and geopolitical interests. 
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